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Tuesday, June 26

26th Jun - Credit Guest: The European iterated prisoners' dilemma

Credit guest post by Macronomics highlights the "prisoner's dilemma" in Europe: even though a closer union might be the least costly option for the nation states, will they all choose it?



Credit - The European iterated prisoners' dilemma

"The only possible Nash equilibrium is to always defect. The proof is inductive: one might as well defect on the last turn, since the opponent will not have a chance to punish the player. Therefore, both will defect on the last turn. Thus, the player might as well defect on the second-to-last turn, since the opponent will defect on the last no matter what is done, and so on. The same applies if the game length is unknown but has a known upper limit." - source Wikipedia

In continuation to game theory references, given we recently touched on the subject in our conversation "Agree to Disagree", we thought this time around we would make a reference to the prisoners' dilemna. After all, in Europe, it is all about game theory, given than many pundits are arguing whether Germany will cooperate or not in resolving the on-going European woes, pledging its balance sheet in the process.
In game theory and in relation to our European iterated prisoner's dilemma we have :
"If it is supposed here that each player is only concerned with lessening his time in jail, the game becomes a non-zero sum game where the two players may either assist or betray the other. In the game, the sole worry of the prisoners seems to be increasing his own reward. The interesting symmetry of this problem is that the logical decision leads each to betray the other, even though their individual ‘prize’ would be greater if they cooperated. In the regular version of this game, collaboration is dominated by betrayal, and as a result, the only possible outcome of the game is for both prisoners to betray the other. Regardless of what the other prisoner chooses, one will always gain a greater payoff by betraying the other. Because betrayal is always more beneficial than cooperation, all objective prisoners would seemingly betray the other.
In the extended form game, the game is played over and over, and consequently, both prisoners continuously have an opportunity to penalize the other for the previous decision. If the number of times the game will be played is known, the finite aspect of the game means that by backward induction, the two prisoners will betray each other repeatedly.
In casual usage, the label "prisoner's dilemma" may be applied to situations not strictly matching the formal criteria of the classic or iterative games, for instance, those in which two entities could gain important benefits from cooperating or suffer from the failure to do so, but find it merely difficult or expensive, not necessarily impossible, to coordinate their activities to achieve cooperation." - source Wikipedia.

For now every European politicians in Europe seem to "Agree to Disagree", it looks to us increasingly probable that the outcome could be different to what is expected from Germany. The outcome for the European project is going to be rather binary. It is either "Federalism" or break-up. In fact it is Germany who has always pushed for more integration, more "Federalism". In September 1994 both Karls Lamers and Wolfgang Schauble from the CDU presented their project of accelerated integration to France. It entailed a faster integration within the European Union for Germany, France, Belgium, Luxembourg and Holland. France at the time was under "Cohabitation", Socialist French President Mitterrand had as Prime Minister Edouard Balladur from the opposing party, having lost ruling majority in the parliamentary elections leading to a political stand-off which lasted for two years. The European game is therefore in the political French camp. President François Hollande having garnered a strong political support in the recent parliamentary elections, it will be interesting to watch if French politicians will indeed accept to lose their powers for the collective good, or, if they decide to cling on their individual mandates and powers and a "Federal Europe" will not happen. Will the French surrender again? We dare to ask, staying politically correct in our conversation ("Cheese-eating surrender monkeys", being a derogatory description of French people that was coined in 1995 by Ken Keeler, then-writer for the television series The Simpsons).
Looking at the "social-clientelism" mentality which has prevailed in French politics in the last 30 years, and given the trauma stemming from the European 2005 referendum, one has to posit the French willingness in moving towards a full lasting Federal European Union.
While many are comparing the need for Europe to evolve in a comparable way to the evolution of the United States towards a full Federal Union. We do not have to go that far to find a more relevant example to the current European plight. In fact as our good credit friend mentioned in one of our most recent conversation, he pointed rightfully towards...Switzerland! The Federal Constitution adopted in 1848 is the legal foundation of the modern Swiss federal state. It is among the oldest constitutions in the world.
There are three main governing bodies on the Swiss federal level: the bicameral parliament (legislative), the Federal Council (executive) and the Federal Court (judicial).
Europe already has all three.

"The Swiss Parliament consists of two houses: the Council of States which has 46 representatives (two from each canton and one from each half-canton) who are elected under a system determined by each canton, and the National Council, which consists of 200 members who are elected under a system of proportional representation, depending on the population of each canton. Members of both houses serve for 4 years. When both houses are in joint session, they are known collectively as the Federal Assembly. Through referendums, citizens may challenge any law passed by parliament and through initiatives, introduce amendments to the federal constitution, thus making Switzerland a direct democracy.
The Federal Council constitutes the federal government, directs the federal administration and serves as collective Head of State. It is a collegial body of seven members, elected for a four-year mandate by the Federal Assembly which also exercises oversight over the Council. The President of the Confederation is elected by the Assembly from among the seven members, traditionally in rotation and for a one-year term; the President chairs the government and assumes representative functions. However, the president is a primus inter pares with no additional powers, and remains the head of a department within the administration." - source Wikipedia.

The Swiss cantons also have a permanent constitutional status and, in comparison with the situation in other countries, a high degree of independence. Under the Federal Constitution, all 26 cantons are equal in status (pari-passu...). Each canton has its own constitution, and its own parliament, government and courts. Switzerland also boasts, in similar fashion to the US, a Federal Supreme Court.
So could it be France derailing the whole European project in the end rather than Germany? We wonder.
But we ramble again, erring on the political side. Time for our credit overview, revisiting our pet subject of bond tenders and the ongoing issues in the peripherals, particularly in Spain, given we recently received the results for the Spanish Bank Recapitalisation independent estimate and 62 billion is the number.

"The Gap is closed" we indicated on the 16th of June in relation to the European space. Now both the Eurostoxx and German 10 year Government yields seems to be moving in synch, lower that is while credit spreads for financials as indicated by Itraxx Financial Senior 5 year CDS index is moving wider following rating agencies multiple downgrades and on-going concerns on peripheral sovereign yield levels - Top Graph Eurostoxx 50 (SX5E), Itraxx Financial Senior 5 year CDS index, German Bund (10 year Government bond, GDBR10), bottom graph Eurostoxx 6 month Implied volatility. - source Bloomberg:

The current European bond picture with Spanish and Italian yields on the rise again - source Bloomberg:
Last week Spanish risk premium reached a new historical high breaching easily the 7% level, with renewed concerns on Spanish banks given the rise in Spanish bad loans. (reaching 8.72% in April from 8.37% in March).

As Societe Generale clearly indicated in their recent global research alert, the markets have indeed lost confidence in Spain:
The challenge European leaders face at the 28-29th June summit is to come out with a big plan as indicated in their recent note by Societe Generale: "Comprehensive restructuring of the economy/the banking sector is  required to restore market confidence....due to a rise in national and regional public debt...".
Indeed, Government debt to GDP could reach 90% of GDP in 2012:
"Spain’s budget deficit is expected to end 2012 at 5.3%, vs 8.9% in 2011, so government debt could reach 90% of GDP this year. On top of that, Spain holds a rising amount of regional debt (which has doubled since December 2008) and contingent liabilities, such as the FROB (Fund for Orderly Bank Restructuring). Taking into account these two elements and the current recession in Spain, debt could rapidly reach unsustainable levels." - source Societe Generale.

Unfortunately, Spanish property market and bank restructuring go hand in hand and as many pundits have indicated, Spanish property bubble and deleveraging has yet to start effectively as indicated by the below graph from Societe Generale:
"House prices could decline by a further 20-25% in an adverse scenario (see last week’s results of the independent evaluation of the Spanish banking sector)." - source Societe Generale.

The Spanish Test Assumptions:

The Stress Test Property Assumptions may not be aggressive enough - source Bloomberg:
"A 19.9% yoy drop in Spanish house prices for the adverse scenario could easily be exceeded if confidence is not restored by the recently announced bailout. At 1Q, yoy declines ranged between 7% and 12% depending on the source, while from 1Q08 highs, house price declines total 21%. Should this rate of deterioration continue, the 4.5% 2013 forecast decline may prove conservative." - source Bloomberg.

The results from the independent audit, the Spanish Assumptions at least looks credible for retail, for corporate less so, according to Bloomberg:
"A 6.8% contraction of lending supply for 2012 and 2013 looks reasonable for retail lending when compared with experience through the crisis. A 6.4% and 5.3% decline for corporate loan supply looks far less cautious when considering that January 2012 data showed a 6% yoy drop, before sovereign fears heightened." - source Bloomberg.

Another issue with the results from the Spanish Test Assumptions comes from the GDP worst case scenario retained no lower than 2009 experience as shown by Bloomberg:
"A decline of 4.1% in Spanish GDP for 2012, the adverse scenario used in the stress test, is less severe than the 4.4% yoy drop of 1H09. While this scenario is calculated from a lower absolute GDP base, it is key for bad-debt experience, unemployment and credit supply. Coordinated EU action is needed to drive long-term interest rate assumptions lower." - source Bloomberg.

We do not want to be seen as party spoilers, but as we posited in relation to the numerous EBA (European Banking Association) test for financial institutions, no test, no stress, no stress, no test...

No wonder Spanish Financial CDS has been on widening trend - source CMA:
[Graph Name]

Unless significant steps are taken in the next European summit, and we mean "shock and awe", given Spain and Italy have significant funding needs until 2014, the game might be coming to an end leading to the defect of some players in the process of our "European iterated prisoners":
- source Societe Generale.

From this similar Societe Generale note, higher loan delinquencies and low industrial production are the main risks:
"Risk 1: Spanish loan delinquencies, back to the 90s
-Spanish bank delinquent loans increased again to 8.72% in April, from 8.37% in March, thereby reaching an 18-year high. This trend is likely to
persist as unemployment and bankruptcies continue to rise.
-Acceleration in number of delinquent loans means Spanish banks are likely to suffer from increasingly larger losses in the future
-Report carried out by two consulting firms estimates Spanish banks' capital shortfall at up to 62bn euros.
Risk 2: European industry deteriorates
-Eurozone industrial production fell 2.3% compared to the same month last year, driven down by the southern Europe countries.
-If the Eurozone fails to undertake the necessary structural reforms, the northern European countries could get drawn into southern Europe’s downward spiral.
-In contrast, US industry has remained quite resilient since the beginning of the year, with total industrial production in May up 4.7 percent yoy."

We will not delve again into the difference between "Stocks and Flows" central to our thought process namely the United States and Europe growth differentiation as we already touched on this subject in our conversation "Growth divergence between US and Europe? It's the credit conditions stupid...".

Moving on to our pet subject of subordinated bond tenders, as at some point, as we argued recently (Peripheral Banks, Kneecap Recap), losses will have to be taken, it is all going Dutch, Dutch auction that is. While ailing Portuguese bank BCP (Banco Comercial Português) announced on the 20th of June a bond tender relating to mortgage backed securities, BBVA bought back some asset-backed bonds too on 26 senior and 25 mezzanine portions of bonds backed by consumer loans, mortgages and business loans, with prices ranging from 46 to 95%. All part of "liability" management exercises to raise some capital and strengthen the capital base, meaning more pain for bondholders in the process.
While the 62 billion being the estimated amount earmarked by independent consultants Oliver Wyman and Roland Berger, burden sharing is currently being considered with the European Union in respect to a 100 billion euro rescue package for the Spanish financial system.
"The government in Madrid is also considering giving more power to the national regulator to restrict sales of loss-absorbing securities such as preferred stock to individuals, said the person. De Guindos has said that preference shares shouldn’t have been sold to retail investors.
Supervisors “failed” over the sale of preference shares to retail investors, said De Guindos June 5 in the Senate.
Spanish lenders sold 22.4 billion euros ($28.2 billion) of preferred stock to individual investors through retail branches. Banks have offered clients holding most of that amount to swap the securities into common stock or other subordinated instruments, according to data compiled by CNMV, the financial markets supervisor." - source Bloomberg
We correctly foresaw this process for weaker peripheral banks.
"First bond tenders, then we will probably see debt to equity swaps for weaker peripheral banks with no access to term funding, leading to significant losses for subordinate bondholders as well as dilution for shareholders in the process." - Macronomics - 20th of November 2011.

We wrote in October 2011 relating to bond tenders and the move towards debt to equity swap:
"We expected others to follow suit and given the difficulty for the weaker players in the peripheral space to access capital at a reasonable rate, as well as needing to boost their core Tier 1 capital base, it was of no surprise to see Portuguese bank Banco Espirito Santo following French bank BPCE in tendering some of its subordinated debt on the 18th of October, but this time around, we have a debt to equity swap."

It is still a game of survival of the fittest, even for some Italian banks, given Monte dei Paschi di Siena (MPS), Italy’s third-biggest bank, according to December 2011 EBA exercise, had a capital shortfall of Euro 3.3 billion. The bank, which must also repay 1.9 billion euros of state aid provided in 2009... Monte Paschi may use the government’s aid program, the so-called Tremonti bond, as part of its plan to boost capital by end of June 2012 (9% Core Tier 1 Capital), Il Sole 24 Ore reported. Also, S and P put MPS’s ratings on Watch Negative citing pressure on the bank’s financial position from a combination of deteriorating asset quality metrics, weakened earnings, and low financial flexibility. Separately, the main shareholder of MPS, the Monte Paschi Foundation has reportedly reached an agreement with its creditor banks to restructure its debt. S and P placed its 'BBB/A-2' L-T and S-T counterparty credit ratings on Italy-based Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA (MPS) on CreditWatch with negative implications. Agency also put all of its ratings on MPS' subordinated, junior subordinated, and hybrid debt issues on CreditWatch negative. The rating action reflects S and P’s view as the convergence of various negative pressures on MPS' financial profile. Monte Paschi First-Quarter profit fell 61% on higher write downs and has a market value of around 2.8 billion euros. MPS is considering selling its 2.5% stake in the Bank of Italy to the central bank to reach the June 2012 threshold.
As indicated by Bloomberg, Italian corporate and household bad debt totaled 109 billion euros ($138 billion) in April, an increase of 15 percent from a year earlier, according to Bank of Italy data.
Non-performing loans rose to 5.4% in March, up from 3% in June 2008, according to Italian Banking Association data. Impairments, excluding writedowns, rose to 58 billion euros from 50 billion euros. CDS on UniCredit, (Italy's largest bank) rose to 532 basis points on June 19 from 292 on March 19, according to data compiled by Bloomberg.
With unemployment rate at 10.2% in April the highest in most than 12 years, Italian banks as well as their Spanish peers are facing economic deterioration facing but are not plagued by housing related issues and high household private debt levels.

If it could be of any solace to European Banking woes, the new capital regime for US Banks will as well trigger at some point some "liability" management exercises namely bond tenders as indicated by CreditSights in their note - US Banks - The New Capital Regime - Bonjour Basel - 24th of June 2012:
"US banking regulators released proposals for new capital rules for banks aimed at complying with Dodd-Frank Basel III. The new guidelines apply to all US banks with some variations/differences for banks over 50 billion USD in assets and were mostly in-line with expectations.
The new guideline call for higher levels of capital, which could make the financial system safer but also reduce returns and cause banks to reassess their balance sheets. They believe that new requirements fortify the banks’ ability to absorb losses and withstand a potential systemic shock, which is a positive for fixed income investors and both positive and negative for equity.
US banks will now have a new set of minimum capital requirements, incorporate additional capital buffers and limitations outlined in Basel III and phase-out trust preferred securities in accordance with the Dodd-Frank Act. When the new limits are fully phased-in, banks are required to maintain a common equity Tier 1 ratio of 7% and Tier 1 ratio of 8.5%, including a capital conservation buffer of 250 bps. The limitations and changes to risk weights could influence business decisions including lending and mortgage servicing.
Trust preferred securities are phased-out reflecting the requirements of the Dodd-Frank Act.
Non cumulative preferreds continue to receive Tier 1 capital treatment and could make up the majority of non-common equity Tier 1 capital. As a result, they expect issuers and investors to focus primarily on preferreds to address their non-common equity Tier 1 Capital and yield needs, respectively."

On a final note Money Markets wager ECB will cut deposit rate as indicated by a recent Bloomberg Chart of the day:
"The CHART OF THE DAY shows that the Eonia-OIS measure, which estimates interbank borrowing costs over the next three months, fell below the 25 basis points the ECB pays for deposits. The last two times this happened the central bank cut the rate within two weeks." - source Bloomberg

"There are few ironclad rules of diplomacy but to one there is no exception. When an official reports that talks were useful, it can safely be concluded that nothing was accomplished."
John Kenneth Galbraith

Stay Tuned!